The year 2025 begins with global attention increasingly fixated on the genocide in Gaza, Syria’s insurrection, and the return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office, as his impending decisions are set to shape geopolitics in West Asia and beyond for, at least, the next four years. For Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), this represents a potential reprieve from more-or-less international scrutiny, given Trump’s first term was marked by a series of controversial dealings involving MBS and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
Sovereign wealth funds are usually meant to provide financial stability or act as an economic cushion during economic crises. However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the Public Investment Fund (PIF) under the control of MBS, has been linked to what Human Rights Watch called “abuses” while being used as a transformative tool to shape geopolitical and economic landscapes. While its rapid expansion has cemented Saudi Arabia’s place as a key player in the region and to a certain extent, on the world stage, it has also brought to attention the fund’s autocratic governance, systemic human rights abuses, and its role in normalizing regional repressive methods.
Consolidating power: The rise of the PIF
The transformation of the PIF from a relatively obscure financial institution into a $925 billion powerhouse is symbolic of MBS’s total consolidation of power. Established in 1971, the PIF managed $84 billion in assets until as recently as 2014. However, MBS’s father, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s ascension to the throne in January 2015 marked a turning point for the fund. The creation of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs (CEDA), chaired by MBS, brought the PIF under his direct control through Decree 270 in March of that year. This structural change paved the way for a dramatic expansion of the fund’s role and resources. In 2016, Vision 2030 was announced, with the PIF positioned as its financial engine.
MBS’s appointment as Crown Prince in June 2017 further solidified his control. That same year, the so-called “anti-corruption campaign” resulted in the mass detention of businessmen, government officials, and royal family members at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh. Many detainees were coerced into surrendering assets as what they called “financial settlements”, including shares in companies, which were transferred directly to the PIF. By December 2017, CEDA board member and Minister of State, Mohammed al Sheikh had overseen the transfer of what is said to be around $100 billion into the fund, further centralizing wealth under MBSs authority.
This display of unequivocal consolidation of power extends beyond the PIF. Best personified in November 2024 when the Crown Prince personally chaired the Cabinet session to approve Saudi Arabia’s 2025 budget. With revenues estimated at $316 billion and expenditures at $343 billion, the budget reflects a $27 billion deficit. MBS’s approval of an annual budget that he proposed, to himself, coupled with his discretion over its implementation, exemplifies a governance model devoid of transparency or accountability. The allocation of state resources to vanity projects like NEOM encapsulates the authoritarian nature of how the PIF is managed.
The consolidation of power extends beyond the PIF. In March 2024, the Crown Prince announced the transfer of 8% of Saudi Aramco’s shares to PIF-owned companies, reducing state ownership to 82.186%. Framed as a move to diversify the economy and expand investments under Vision 2030, the transfer was mainly a lifeline for PIF’s financial position and credit rating, all the while, giving MBS even greater control over the kingdom’s most valuable asset by far, and one of only seven companies worldwide that form what is colloquially referred to as the “Trillion-Dollar Club”. The statement accompanying the announcement vaguely referred to the transfer as a “continuation of Saudi Arabia’s long-term initiatives to boost and diversify the national economy and expand investment opportunities”, with little regard for the already worrisome nature of such consolidations of power.
In July 2024, PIF claimed the highest accreditation level, “Level 5: Optimized,” for its Strategy and Performance Management System from The KPI Institute. The recognition by the “global authority on Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) research” is of course based on evaluation of performance indicators, however, no details about the “more than 300 items” or criteria evaluated in the case of PIF were disclosed publicly. This raises questions about the value of such accolades when tied to an institution already shrouded in secrecy.
The fund’s deals extended to technology with its October 2024 partnership with Google Cloud to establish a global AI hub in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. The project, announced at the Future Investment Initiative, aims to generate $71 billion in GDP over eight years while advancing Arabic-language AI models. Yet, the partnership underscores the paradox of positioning Saudi Arabia as a technological leader while the kingdom continues to suppress freedom of expression and dissent with technology being one of the tools exploited to do so.
In January 2025, PIF announced its acquisition of a 23.08% stake in the Saudi Reinsurance Company (Saudi Re) through a capital increase and subscription to new shares. The move, described as essential for retaining reinsurance premiums domestically, highlighted PIF’s growing dominance and the ongoing trend of extending control over critical sectors of the economy. The statement issued publicly seemed to carefully make it a point of mentioning “shareholder consent” as an achievement of sorts, which justifiably raises familiar concerns about the rubber-stamping of significant transactions.
The fund’s financial maneuvers extended further in the same month, January 2025, with PIF securing its first Murabaha credit facility for $7 billion. Promoted as part of a diversified funding strategy, this Shariah-compliant structure is supported by a syndicate of 20 international and regional financial institutions that remain unnamed. However, the announcement fails to address the broader implications of the fund’s reliance on debt to sustain its investment spree. The fund’s increasing engagement with external lenders only underscores the lack of transparency and long-term clarity in its operations.
The human toll of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030
The PIF’s entanglement in systemic human rights abuses is extremely troubling. The construction of NEOM, announced in 2017 and funded by the PIF, exemplifies this. In January 2020, residents of Al Khuraiba, Sharma, and Gayal were informed of their impending eviction to make way for the project.
By April, Saudi security forces had killed Abdulrahim al-Huwaiti, a local activist who protested the displacement, in what was described as an “extrajudicial killing”. Leading up to his killing, the victim recorded a 12-minute video saying, “I would not be surprised if they come to kill me in my house now, and place a weapon next to me,” Before recording another video of security forces in front of his house on the same day, “See them? The police have come to get me,” he proclaimed.
Residents of the area recorded footage from outside his house where multiple gunshots could be heard, another video after the incident was uploaded showing the inside of al-Huwaiti’s house with walls completely defaced by bullet holes. Authorities released a statement claiming precisely what the victim had already said he would be accused of, and stating that he was killed in an exchange of gunshots with security forces and that two police officers had been injured in the process, without providing any evidence. His death was followed by the sentencing of three of his relatives to death in October 2022 for resisting eviction.
The scale of displacement linked to NEOM has barely drawn any meaningful public condemnation. By 2024, thousands of residents had been forcibly evicted, often with little to no compensation, to make way for futuristic megaprojects, or as they are referred to on the official PIF website, “Giga-Projects”. The lack of stakeholder consultation or avenues for redress just further exemplifies the systematic disregard for human rights in Saudi Arabia’s development strategy.
The violations perpetrated against the Huwaitat tribe are not isolated incidents. There have also been large-scale demolitions and evictions of approximately half a million people in connection with the $20 billion Jeddah Central Development project. According to a survey that was carried out in 2022, over 70% of residents in the historic inner city have been left without financial compensation or adequate means to relocate elsewhere. The way these projects have been implemented further showcases the complete disregard of people’s livelihoods in the face of the Crown Prince’s vision of development.
Beyond PIF-specific projects, labor exploitation remains a pervasive issue in Saudi Arabia. A recently published documentary by British ITV claims that up to 21,000 workers have died while constructing NEOM’s The Line, with another 100,000 more reportedly missing. Furthermore, Amnesty International recently published a report on Carrefour facilities in Riyadh, Dammam, and Jeddah revealing widespread abuse of migrant workers, recruited under false pretenses and subjected to grueling 16-hour workdays. Workers from Nepal, India, and Pakistan described being underpaid, forced to live in squalid housing, and threatened with dismissal if they resisted overtime. One former warehouse picker compared their treatment to that of “animals,” stressing the prevalent and systemic dehumanization of laborers. Carrefour’s franchising partner, UAE-based Majid Al Futtaim, failed to address these violations adequately, pointing to possible complicity from the Emirati holding company in labor exploitation under Saudi Arabia’s kafala system, which prohibits unionization and offers no guaranteed minimum wage.
The much-scrutinized kafala system, which binds workers to their employers, leaving them vulnerable to abuse, remains a linchpin of labor exploitation. Despite promises of reform, migrant workers continue to report widespread wage theft, overcrowded housing, and retaliation for raising grievances. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is now considering a landmark complaint against Saudi Arabia, demanding comprehensive reforms to its labor laws.
Sportswashing as a strategy for global influence
Investments in sports and entertainment have been the main tool used by the PIF to somewhat sanitize Saudi Arabia’s international image and avoid facing widespread scrutiny from the international community. Its acquisition of an 80% stake in English Premier League football club Newcastle United for $415 million in 2021, is a prime example of this strategy. The move was widely criticized as an attempt to sportswash Saudi Arabia’s human rights record, but the controversy surrounding the deal seemed to simmer down pretty quickly.
Another instance of the wealth fund being used in football took place in 2019 when the Saudi government agreed to pay $310 million over ten years for the hosting rights of the annual Spanish Super Cup competition until 2029. Tensions between these investments and the nation’s realities have posed sociological challenges. Following a match that was hosted in Jeddah in January 2025, between Real Madrid and Mallorca, wives of Mallorca players reported being harassed by local fans, with incidents of physical groping and aggressive filming highlighting the lack of security measures at such events.
The PIF’s foray into sports extends beyond football. Saudi Arabia’s investments in Formula 1, boxing, and the LIV Golf tour have also drawn similar criticism for deflecting attention from domestic human rights abuses through the use of a non-disparagement clause (NDA) that prevents the Professional Golfers’ Association and its officials from criticizing Saudi Arabia’s human rights record. These ventures, coupled with the kingdom’s bid for the 2034 FIFA World Cup, underscore the centrality of sportswashing in Saudi Arabia’s global strategy.
Fresh off the controversy that has surrounded the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, there has been widespread claims that FIFA has been complicit in thousands of laborers’ deaths leading up to the competition due to poor working conditions.
The decision to award Saudi Arabia the 2034 FIFA World Cup has brought renewed scrutiny to FIFA and to the PIF’s role in international diplomacy. FIFA’s evaluation of Saudi Arabia’s bid, which awarded it a record-breaking average score of 4.2 out of 5, overlooked critical human rights concerns. A 23-page briefing by human rights organization, ALQST, details the systemic risks associated with hosting the tournament. Typically, FIFA requires candidates to submit a human rights strategy addressing the human rights risks in the potential host nation. As highlighted in the report, FIFA evaluated the bid based on a seemingly flawed independent human rights context assessment that was commissioned by the Saudi Arabian Football Federation. The categories of evaluation included forced displacement, labor exploitation and discrimination under the kafala system, freedom of expression, and the criminalization of dissent, all of which the Saudi bid falls short of actually meeting.
The broader repercussions of PIF’s controversial strategies
The Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund’s rise is emblematic of the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes wielding economic power on a global scale. Despite the Santiago Principles advocating for transparency in sovereign wealth funds, PIF remains shrouded in secrecy, with decisions driven by political expediency rather than public interest. This lack of checks and balances has far-reaching consequences, from worsening domestic inequalities to undermining international norms.
The international community’s failure to hold Saudi Arabia and its de facto head of state, MBS accountable has only emboldened the regime. Human rights watchdogs have reported unprecedented attacks on human rights defenders and social media critics of the state and government.
Domestically, PIF’s prioritization of so-called ‘Giga-Projects’ like NEOM comes at the expense of social welfare. Poverty remains a pressing issue in Saudi Arabia, with 13.6% of Saudi nationals living below the poverty line, a figure that excludes vulnerable populations such as migrant workers.
Saudi Arabia’s PIF is both a testament to the kingdom’s ambitions and a reflection of its systemic flaws. Under MBS, it has become a tool for consolidating power, perpetuating human rights abuses, and reshaping global norms. While its investments promise and to a degree have achieved economic transformation, they come at a steep social and ethical cost.
The absence of a consequential dialogue about the ethical implications of ‘sportswashing’ and the complicity of global institutions in legitimizing authoritarian regimes is inexcusable. The international community must grapple with the implications of allowing autocrats to wield such influence unchecked, lest we normalize a world where power supersedes accountability and human dignity.
