The Egyptian Parliament recently passed the bill for the new Labor Law, No. 14 of 2025, replacing the long-standing Law No. 12 of 2003. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi approved the law on May 5, and the law is set to enter into force in August. Celebrated by state officials and state-owned media as “the president’s gift to workers”, a “historical victory for workers,” and a vital step towards modernization, the law is framed as necessary to align with contemporary economic realities and, ostensibly, safeguard worker rights. This rhetoric paints a picture of progress, suggesting a move away from outdated regulations towards a more dynamic, efficient labor market.
There are indeed certain components aimed at enhancing worker protections, such as the abolition of “Form 6,” a pre-signed resignation form in the old law, often abused by employers, in addition to formally recognizing contemporary working arrangements like remote work, and, notably, broadening the definition of a ‘worker’ to potentially encompass segments of the vast informal economy.
However, a closer examination suggests a more complex and arguably bleaker reality for the nation’s workforce. Far from empowering workers, Law 14/2025 represents a significant regression, functioning as a facade for deepening neoliberal restructuring, a sophisticated tool for enhanced state and private capital control over the labor force, and a profound betrayal of worker rights in the guise of reformist language.
The new law fundamentally entrenches, rather than alleviates, the already skewed balance of power between capital and labor in Egypt. Critically, as highlighted by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, its passage occurred through an abrupt and rushed deliberation process, violating accepted legislative procedures and lacking actual dialogue or worker consultation.
This lack of dialogue contributes to what Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly had previously admitted as a growing “crisis of trust“ between citizens and the government. EIPR aptly characterizes the legislation as a “lopsided law” that compounds the flaws of previous legislation, intensifying the government’s favoritism towards employers at the expense of workers.
An Illusion of Progress
Beneath the reformist rhetoric, the new labor law systematically dismantles existing, albeit imperfect, worker protections and introduces mechanisms that deepen economic hardship and job insecurity. Two areas illustrate this regressive trend: wages and contract stability.
The assault on wages is particularly concerning. Article 34 of the previous law mandated a minimum annual raise of 7% of the basic wage. In the new law, Article 12 reduces the annual raise to 3% of the social insurance subscription wage. This change has major consequences, as the insurance wage is often significantly lower than the actual basic wage, leading to a substantially smaller raise in real terms.
Moreover, the state-controlled National Wages Council, outlined in Article 101, a body dominated by government representatives heavily outnumbering worker representation, can exempt employers from paying even this minimal raise during vaguely defined “exceptional economic conditions,” as per Article 102, without clear criteria for such exemptions.
The law also entrenches job insecurity by failing to regulate fixed-term contracts. Articles 88 and 154 leave workers in a vulnerable position, as employers can use these contracts indefinitely, even for permanent job roles. There is little to no protection against the practice of not renewing contracts, which allows employers to dismiss workers without cause under the pretense of contract expiration. Only after five years of continuous service does a worker become entitled to a meager severance payment upon non-renewal. This aligns perfectly with exploitative neoliberal demands for labor “flexibility.”
The Director of the Women’s Program at the Center for Trade Union and Workers’ Services, Dr. Amal Abdel Hamid, warns that this permits arbitrary dismissal without fair compensation. EIPR also highlights how ambiguities and contradictions in termination articles permit such dismissals.
Additionally, Article 167 mandates that employees submit a written resignation and await administrative approval. While this may seem like a standard procedural detail, it amplifies the power imbalance during already insecure job situations, limiting a worker’s ability to leave for better opportunities.
Consequently, the system effectively traps workers from both sides; they can be easily dismissed at the employer’s discretion, yet face obstacles when trying to exit on their own terms. The new labor law in effect allows employers to treat workers as expendable resources, with their job security overshadowed by the convenience and interests of private capital.
The head of the economic and social rights unit at EIPR, Wael Gamal, points out that this structure fails to protect wages against high inflation and excludes the majority of the workforce, who are not covered by social insurance and thus receive no guaranteed raise at all. Kamal Abbas, the CTUWS general coordinator, criticized the lack of meaningful dialogue during the law’s development, stating, “dialogue around the law was very limited, and even on the rare occasion of a dialogue, it did not include any worker representation. Instead, it was mostly with the representatives of multinational corporations.”
Dr. Amal Abdelhamid echoed her colleagues’ statements, adding that many of their organizations’ suggestions were either partially addressed or completely ignored and that their repeated requests for worker representation in parliamentary hearings went unanswered.
Given the challenges of an already flawed and outdated law, the new labor law fails to address the existing issues workers face and creates opportunities for further employment abuses and exploitation while suppressing wages. EIPR called on the Egyptian president not to ratify the new law, advocating for salary increases tied to the total wage and indexed to inflation.
Mechanisms of Control
Beyond direct attacks on wages and job security, Law 14/2025 consolidates state and employer control over the workforce. It utilizes ministerial discretion and dismantles collective bargaining rights, particularly the right to strike, diminishing resistance and undermining worker autonomy.
Perhaps the most blatant power grab concerns collective action. The right to strike, a historically fundamental tool for labor, is rendered almost impotent, drawing sharp criticism from labor rights groups like the Center for Trade Union & Workers Services (CTUWS). While nominally recognized, exercising this right requires navigating numerous procedural hurdles.
Article 232 mandates that strikes must be notified to the employer and authorities at least ten days in advance, while strikes are banned entirely in vaguely defined “vital establishments.” Yet another rule-by-decree, Article 234 stipulates that it is yet to be determined by the Prime Minister what qualifies as a vital establishment.
As EIPR argues, these provisions impose further restrictions, removing workers’ “last remaining tool of leverage.” The 2024 Global Labor Rights Index currently rates Egypt poorly in terms of access to decent work, alongside a low score of 3/10 for workers’ right to strike. These new restrictions are unlikely to improve that rating.
A striking element of the law is its reliance on future ministerial decrees to define the specifics of worker rights in several pressing areas. Rather than safeguarding labor protections through legislation passed by parliament, the law shifts significant authority to the Minister of Manpower and other state bodies. Key regulations outline important aspects related to new work models, such as remote and part-time employment, as detailed in Article 100, which covers definition, contract guidelines, and implementation. Additionally, Articles 118, 119, and 123 may permit employers to implement 12-hour work shifts by providing exceptions to standard working hours and rest periods.
This “rule by decree” approach legitimizes state control over labor rights, bypasses democratic accountability, creates uncertainty for workers whose rights remain undefined, and allows the executive branch of the government to tailor regulations to suit shifting economic priorities or employer demands, far from public scrutiny or worker input.
Continuity of Oppression
While Law 14/2025 mainly impacts workers of the private sector, its harshest effects are reserved for the most vulnerable, reinforcing existing structures of inequality and ensuring the continuity of oppression for marginalized segments of the Egyptian working class. The law achieves this through both explicit exclusion and deliberately inadequate inclusion.
The most glaring example is the outright exclusion of domestic workers, like those who perform household services, from the law’s scope (Article 1, Promulgation), continuing the practice of the previous 2003 law (Article 4). This vast workforce, predominantly women, estimated by media reports and Private Sector Workers Syndicate head, Shaaban Khalifa, to be around 800,000 strong, remains entirely outside the scope of legal protection regarding wages, hours, leave, or dismissal. Decades of promises for specific legislation governing domestic work have yielded nothing, leaving these workers subject to the whims of their employers without any guarantees of their labor rights under the law. This deliberate omission, condemned again by EIPR, perpetuates the invisibility and hyper-exploitation inherent in domestic labor.
Similarly, the law’s approach to the massive informal or “unorganized” workforce, estimated by the International Labour Organization to constitute around 67% of the labor force, is deeply flawed. While Article 75 supposedly aims to organize and protect these workers, the actual mechanisms are weak and reliant on ministerial discretion. The law states its provisions apply if irregular workers are employed by an employer, but the crucial rules defining their rights, registration, and access to support are deferred to future ministerial decisions. Even seemingly positive steps, like definitions for workplace bullying or recognizing platform workers, are rendered hollow by a general lack of enforcement mechanisms, a point underscored by EIPR’s observation that the government has utterly failed to enforce its own minimum wage decisions in the private sector, making such laws effectively meaningless for workers.
Beyond these excluded groups, the law’s primary targets are the majority within the formal sector. Workers trapped in uncertain employment contracts, those reliant on the minimal annual wage increase now subject to employer exemptions, and those in sectors deemed “vital” who have lost the effective right to strike—these constitute the bulk of Egypt’s formally recognized workforce. By design, the law systematically dismantles workers’ bargaining power, leaves them more exposed to employer coercion, and diminishes their ability to organize collectively when their rights under the law are violated.
This serves the dual purpose of ensuring a compliant, low-cost labor force attractive to private capital investment while simultaneously reinforcing the state’s political control by suppressing potential sources of organized dissent. The arrest and detention of nine striking workers from the Turkish-Egyptian Ready-Made Garments Company in Qalyubiyya—accused of inciting an unlawful strike after demanding better pay—illustrates how security forces criminalize basic forms of labor rights and resistance to employer violations, and extend repression beyond the factory floor into workers’ homes. It is merely one episode among many comparable cases in recent times.
The state’s prioritization of cheap labor as a key selling point to foreign capital was made explicit when President Sisi recently met with and brazenly told US business leaders, “We have labor whose cost is incomparable to any other place.”
The “reform” ultimately benefits employers seeking “flexibility,” and the state seeking stability through control and neoliberal despotism, all at the expense of the working class.
Beyond the Facade
Egypt’s Labor Law No. 14 of 2025 is a constructed facade. The systematic erosion of worker rights, the consolidation of state and employer control, and the deepening entrenchment of neoliberal discipline. This law attacks wages, institutionalizes job insecurity through unregulated contracts, eviscerates the right to strike for crucial segments of the workforce, empowers unaccountable ministerial decrees over legislative rights, and deliberately excludes or marginalizes the most vulnerable workers, including domestic and informal laborers, continuing patterns seen in the previous 2003 law.
The passage of this law sheds light on the fact that legislative reforms under the current regime are designed to manage and control workers more effectively in the service of capital accumulation and “state stability.” It represents an intensification of policies that prioritize investor confidence, fueled by the promise of uniquely cheap labor, over worker dignity and security. The severity of its flaws led EIPR to publicly call for the bill’s return to parliament for complete reconsideration.
Real progress for Egyptian workers, and everywhere in the world, will not come from such top-down, state-managed “reforms.” It requires a fundamental shift in the balance of power. This necessitates the strengthening of independent, democratic trade unions capable of challenging employers when their rights are violated; the legislative guarantee of a living wage based on socioeconomic realities indexed to inflation; the inclusion of all workers, including domestic and informal workers, under protective legislation; and the right to organize and strike. Until then, laws like 14/2025 will remain what they are, instruments of repression under the thin veil of reform.
As the Egyptian state touts the new law as a landmark reform, workers across the country know all too well that rights on paper mean little without the power to claim them. In a country where the phrase “البلد دي فيها قانون” (this country has laws) is often wielded by authorities to coerce, silence, and intimidate, it has long been understood—especially by the most marginalized—that the law often serves power, not justice.
Even if Law 14 had offered stronger protections, its implementation would still depend on a system designed to deny workers the tools to demand their rights. True justice for Egypt’s working class requires more than legislative reform; it demands dismantling the structures of coercion, exclusion, and repression that define the current labor regime. Until then, “reform” will remain a hollow slogan, and the law another instrument to keep workers in check rather than set them free.
